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The third German edition of Oscar Cullmann's Christus
and die Zeit l appeared in 1962. The fact that after fourteen
years a new edition was desirable testifies to the continuing
influence of Cullmann's thought, which has aroused wide
interest in the English-speaking world. Doubtless the new
English edition will be warmly welcomed. Cullmann's acceptance in German theology, toward which the book was originally
directed, has been less enthusiastic. Constituting as it does a
debate-an Auseinandersetzung-with both Barth and Bultmann, it has met with comparatively little agreement in
Germany a t a time when the weight of prestige has been
passing from the one to the other of these theologians. In
some sense in Germany these years Cullmann has seemed
like a voice crying out from the sideline^.^
This situation lends significance to the fact that in this new
edition the author has chosen in place of a foreword to write
a 19-page statement entitled: "Riickblick auf die Wirkung
First ed,, Ziirich, I 946 ; second ed., I 948 ; Eng. trans., Christ and
Time, Philadelphia, 1950. All references here are to the 3rd German
edition, cited as ChZ.
Thus, for instance, H. W. Bartsch, "Anmerkungen zu 0. Cullmann:
Christus und die Zeit," Kerygma und Mythos, I1 (Hamburg, 1952)~
Pp. 36-38, while declaring that Christ and Time "as a whole is consciously formulated in opposition to Bultmann's program'' ("als ganzes
bewusst im Gegensatz zu dem Programm Bultmanns gestaltet ist"),
at the same time devotes only two and a half pages to its consideration
and concludes with the statement that it is a book "the discussion
of which for our problem must be limited to these remarks" ("dessen
Diskussion sich jedoch fiir unser Problem auf diese Anmerkungen
beschranken muss").
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des Buches in der Theologie der Nachkriegszeit"-"A
Look
Back at the Impact of the Book on the Theology of the PostWar Period." In this "Look Back" Cullmann is concerned
with much more than the influence of his book on others.
Rather, he gives much of his attention to ways in which his
work has been misunderstood by theologians of varying
positions. Indeed, this introductory statement could almost
have been entitled: "How My Book Has Been Understoodand Misunderstood.',
How relevant Chist and Time is to confkrnporary issues
central to New Testament theology is indicated by the
stature of those who have reacted to his book. Cullmann
cites among others the reactions of Karl Barth and his followers, Rudolf Bultmann and his pupils, Fritz Buri as a disciple
of Albert Schweitzer, and some Roman Catholics. That in
each case the criticism has involved a prime theological
concern testifies to the book's centrality; that Cullmann
feels that he has been misunderstood in many cases demonstrates the need for a clarifying statement such as he now
has given.

I t is understandable that Cullmann devotes much at tention
to the reaction of the Bultmannians. Although Christ and
Time was originally written with the positive purpose of
determining the "essence of the New Testament message,"
it has been popularly looked upon as an attack on Bultmann's
demythologizing and existential hermene~tic.~
In this connection it is relevant also that the most important review of
Christ and Time to have appeared was Bultmann's discussion
in the Theologische Literaturzeitung.5 In distinction to almost

'

8ChZJ p. 11.
See n. 2 above.
"Heilsgeschichte und Geschichte," ThLZ, LXXIII (1948), cols.
659 ff. Among other reviews: R. C. Denton, AThR, XXXII (195~)J
303-5 ; Lucetta Mowry, JBR, XVIII (1950)~236 f. ; P. S. Minear,
JBLj LXX (1951)~51-3; John Rowland, HJ, XLIX (1951)~416-17.

every other critic mentioned, Cullmann agrees that Bultmann
has understood him correctly6 and thus has been able to
discuss the point really a t issue : the essence of the New Testament kerygma. For Cullmann this includes as an integral
part the temporal tension in the economy of salvation between
"already fulfilled" (at the Cross) and "not yet completed" (at
the Parousia) and the consequent orientation of all events
to the Cross, which constitutes the "midpoint" of time;' for
Bultmann it is rather a call to existential commitment leading
to authentic self-under~tanding.~
CuUmann is careful to point
out-and this needed to be done-that for him it is the
tension, not temporality as such, not the concept of linear time,
that is essential to the kerygr-na. At the same time he continues
to use these other concepts because they are the most useful
frame of reference he has found for expressing the essential
tension between the Cross and the Parousia.
The basic exegetical issue between CulImann and the Bultmannians becomes clear in Cullmann's estimate of Hans
Conzelmann's Die Mitte der Zeit.g He recognizes that the
latter has taken his title from Cullmann's own emphasis on
the cross as the midpoint of redemptive history, and he agrees
largely with Conzelmann's analysis of Luke-Acts as setting
forth the notion of redemptive history. The point at which
Cullmann and Conzelmann are in basic disagreement-and
at which their two books become antithetical-is in the evaluation of the Lucan view as primary or secondary to the
kerygma.10 For Cullmann it is primary, because he finds its
roots already in the teaching of Jesus; for Conzelmann, as for
the Bultmannians in general, it is a secondary and erroneous

' chz, pp. 13, 20.
' C h Z , p. 19.

Bultmann'~own position is set forth especially well in History and
Eschatology: The Presence of Eternity (New York, 1957).
Gottingen, 1954;Eng. trans., The Theology of St. Luke (New York,
1960).

lo ChZ, pp. I 6 f . ; Cullmann, "Parousieverzogerung und
turn," ThLZ, LXXXIII (1958),col. 3.

Urchristen-
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construction introduced by Luke in answer to the problem
that arose in the early church when the Parousia did not occur
as expected. Bultmann and his students in general, understand
the correct solution of this Parousieverzogerungs~~obZemto
have been found by Paul and John, whom they see as having
begun to demythologize in the direction of existential understanding of certain elements in Christianity inherited from
Jewish apocalyptic and Gnostic-Hellenistic mystery religions.
This involved a reinterpretation of the nature of eschatology. l1
Cullmann, on the other hand, maintains in opposition to the
Bultmannians that I) Luke's heilsgeschichtlich view of
eschatology is not a break (in the wrong direction) with the
previous thought of the church, but that it is an elaboration
and prolongation of the essential temporal tension already
present in the teaching of Jesus; and 2) Paul and John do
not demythologize, but rather share in this essential tension
between "already fulfilled" and "not yet -completed." l2
Thus for him there is no basic antithesis in the eschatological
views of Luke on the one side and of Paul and John on the
other, as there is for Bultmann.
These lines of debate show on what a broad front Cullmann
fights his battle. Although for years he has been expounding
his position in his lectures to his students, his published
defense, particularly of the crucial issues raised under 2) above,
is not yet complete. This makes his promised book on redemptive history and eschatology in the New Testament the more
to be desired.

I11
In discussing the reactions of Barth and his pupils to
Christ and Time,Cullmann emphasizes that most criticisms
have arisen from one basic misunderstanding of his book:
that he was writing a treatise on the concefit of time and insisting that the Biblical conception of time as linear was
l1

Bultmann, History and Eschatology, pp. 38 ff.
p. 16.

la ChZ,

essential.13 Cullmann confesses himself ready to share in the
blame for such a misunderstanding, however, in that he does
open his book with a comparison between the Biblical conception of time as linear and the Hellenistic notion of it as
cyclical and then goes on to discuss "Time and Eternity."
He now emphasizes that the notion of linear time is for him
only a foil, an unessential but useful frame of reference for the
presentation of the essential element of the kerygma-the
tension between "already" and "not yet." l4 Although he
had already warned briefly against this misunderstanding
in the Foreword to his second edition,15that it was so widely
overlooked makes clear the importance of the present fuller
statement.
Cullmann's relationship to Barth, his colleague at Base1
for more than a quarter of a century, raises still a broader
question: what are the respective realms of the Biblical exegete and of the systematic theologian ? Is it allowed the latter
to raise questions and seek answers not open to the former?
Cullmann answers emphatically in the affirmative. The exegete
must limit himself to those problems clearly dealt with as
problems in Scripture, and he must deal with these problems
within the frames of reference set out by the Biblical writers.
Thus for the exegete Scripture is normative both for subject
matter and for conceptual context. Cullmann declares that
as an exegete, he must be content "before any evaluations,
any judgments, yes, perhaps even before any 'encounter'
in my understanding of existence, before any faith, simply to
listen obediently to what the men of the New Covenant desire
This seems also to have been the understanding of P. S. Minear,
pp. 23 f.: "To him [Cullmann], all theology that is truly
Christian is a continuation of Biblical history; any loss, therefore, of
the distinctively Biblical conception of time is a sign of dangerous
deviation from the gospel" ; cf. the present writer's similar misunderstanding, "Eschatology and Time," The Ministry, XXIX : 6 (June,
1956), 29-31.
l4 ChZ, pp. 20-23.
l5 Ibid., p. 32.
lS

oP.cit.,
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to convey to me as revelation, even when it is completely
foreign to me." l6 To the systematic theologian, on the other
hand, he allows a broader and more adventurous scope: he
must indeed confront Scripture with contemporary philosophical questions and employ philosophical methodology in
seeking his answers. But even here there remains a Scriptural
norm: while consideration is not restricted to those problems
raised as such by Scripture, it is justified only if the possibility
of the problem is at least implied by the Bible. Furthermore,
the systematic theologian's conclusions must not alter or
ignore the substance of Scriptural assertions.17 This latter
position is rooted in Cullmann's concept of the apostolic
period, the time of the central event, the midpoint in redemptive history, as normative for the subsequent history of the
church.18
In view of this objective distinction between the limits
imposed on the exegete and those open to -the systematic
theologian, Cullmann confesses that his criticisms of Barth's
attempt to relate God's time to the time of salvation may not
have been entirely justified, and foregoes further comment
until Barth has discussed eschatology in the Church Dogmatics.19
The point at which this distinction becomes especially
relevant to contemporary discussion is, of course, with Bultmann, in whose work there is no clear line between the exegetical and the dogmatic-or perhaps to say it better, who is both
an exegete and a dogmatician. From the side of Bultmann this
Ibid., pp. 25 f.
Ibid., pp. 22 f.; cf. Cullmann, "The Necessity and Function of
Higher Criticism," The Early Church (London, 1956), pp. 14-16.
As an example of an area open to the systematic theologian but closed
to the exegete, Cullmann offers the question of the relation between
time as connected with the redemptive-historical action of God, and
His eternity. He sees this justified by implications of God's eternity
in such passages as Jn I : I ; I Cor 15 : 28.
l8 ChZ, pp. 31 f.; "The Tradition," The Early Church, pp. 75-87.
l9 See K. Barth, Die Kirchliche Dogmatik (Miinchen, 1g32), I : 1,
486 ff.; I1 : I, 709 ff.; cf. Cullmann's criticisms, ChZ, pp. 23, 29, 72.
Is
l7

problem has been discussed in an article by Walter Klaas.20
He quotes Barth's evaluation that
Bultmann is an exegete. But it is impossible to engage him in
exegetical discussion. For he is also a systematic theologian of the
type which handles texts in such a way that their exegesis is always
controlled by a set of dogmatic presuppositions and is thus wholly
dependent upon their ~ a l i d i t y . ~ '

Klaas then declares that the question of how far Bultmann
allows his exegesis to be ruled by systematics must be answered in terms of the starting point and the object of his historicalcritical meth0dology.2~After reviewing the rules of this methodology as worked out in The History of the Syno$tic Traditi0n,2~he points to the program of demythologizing as their
only possible outcome: if one takes as his point of departure
the origin of Christian tradition in the piety and theology of
the earliest church, one must inevitably demythologize in
order to proceed beyond it.24TOBultmann this is clear on two
counts. I) Every kerygmatic statement in the New Testament
contains an admixture of theological concept; even the
simplest kerygmatic declaration, KGplog 'Irjao& (2 Cor 4 : 5 ) ,
presupposes a particular understanding of the Kyrios-concept.
For Bultmann this precludes a clear distinction between
kerygmatic and theological pronouncements and necessitates
demythologization. He sees Paul and John as already having
begun to do t h i ~ . 22)~This procedure is necessary for proclamation. At this point Bultmann's understanding of the work of
20

"Der systematische Sinn der Exegese Rudolf Bultmanns" in

G.Bornkamm and W. Klaas, Mythos und Evangelium (ThEH, N. F.,
Nr. 26, Miinchen, 1953)~pp. 29-56.
21

Barth, Chu~chDogmatics (Edinburgh, 1960), I11 : 2, 445 ; Klaas

op. cit., pp. 29 ff.
Klaas, @. cit., p. 33.
(Oxford, 1963), pp. 321-374.
24 Klaas, o+. cit., p. 37.
2s Bultmann, "Das Problem des Verhaltnisses von Theologie und
Verkiindigung im Neuen Testament," in Azlx Sources de la tradition
chrLtienne. Mklanges o8erts d M. Maurice Goguel (NeuchAtel, I~SO),
P. 34.
22

23
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the Spirit-which
he shares with Barth-is
important.
Revelation, He who reveals and He who is revealed are
understood as one in the event of proclamation. Thus the
Spirit is the power of proclamation in the community. The
word that encounters the Church is the Word she herself
proclaims. This is the word-Jesus' word-that the promised
Spirit brings "to your remembrance." 26 Klaas concludes:
The question of the correctness or incorrectness of Rudolf Bultmann's systematization of exegesis can be reduced then to the
question of the right understanding of the act of preaching. Systematically and exegetically considered, the decision on this question
must coincide with the determination of whether with Bultmann's
understanding of the work of the Spirit in the community's proclamation of the Word, the Reformers' "sola fide," "sola gratia,"
"sola scriptura," "solus Christus," . . . that is to say, the freedom
and the continuing freedom of grace, is understood and appropriated.2'

When we compare this rationale for Bultmann's fusion
of exegesis and systematics with Cullmann's point of view,
it is important to recognize that they both are committed
to the viewpoint and procedures of form-criticism.28Although
Cullmann has used form-criticism fruitfully throughout a
lifetime of research, his point of departure from Bultmann in
this regard is to deny that it inevitably leads to demythologi26 Bultmann, Das Evangelium des Johannes (Meyers Kommentar,
16th ed.; Gottingen, 195g), pp. 475 f.; 441 ff.; Klaas, op. cit., pp. 55 f.
27 Ibid., p. 56: "Die Frage nach Recht oder Unrecht der Systematisierung der Exegese bei Rudolf Bultmann lasst sich demnach reduzieren auf die Frage nach dem rechten Verstandnis des Aktes der Predigt.
Die Entscheidung in dieser Frage wird, systematisch und exegetisch
gesehen, mit der Feststellung fallen miissen, ob bei Bultmanns Verstandnis vom Wirken des Geistes in der Wortverkiindigung der
Gemeinde das reformatorische 'sola fide', 'sola gratia', 'sola scriptura',
'sola [sic.] Christus', . . . also die Freiheit und das Freibleiben der Gnade
verstanden und aufgenommen ist." Cf. G. Bornkamm, in Bornkamm
and Klaas, op. cit., pp. 28 f.; Bultmann, "Das Problem des Verhaltnisses von Theologie und Verkiindigung," op. cit., p. 35.
For Cullmann's positive attitude toward form-criticism see his
"Unzeitgemasse Bemerkungen zum 'historischen Jesus' der Bultmannschule" in H. Ristow and K. Matthiae, eds., Der historische Jesus und
der kerygmatische Christus (Berlin, 1962), pp. 266 f.

zing and existential exegesis. In fact, he sees form-criticism
as a tool of the objective critical-historical method, and hence
at base in contradiction to existential exege~is.2~
In their
common concern to determine the kernel of the New Testament message, both have employed form-criticism, Bultmann
has found that kernel in a kerygma which demands demythologization. Cullmann has found it in a view of redemptive
history characterized by a tension that is foreign and uncongenial to the modern mind, but one which he nevertheless
insists is constitutive of the kernel.
I t is just a t this point that a most serious problem for
Cullmann's position arises. Can the kerygma as he conceives it,
alien as it is to modern man's understanding, be effectively
proclaimed today? Indeed, is the preaching of this kerygma
really proclamation at all? Cullmann faces this challenge
squarely in his "Look Back," and promises a f u l l answer in his
forthcoming book on e s c h a t o l ~ g yUntil
. ~ ~ it appears, it would
be premature to carry this problem further. On its effective
answer will rest much of the justification of the radical
distinction that he makes between exegesis and systematic
theology.
It is probably wrong, however, to see this question of
"proclaimability" as the basic issue between Cullmann and
Bultmann. John B. Cobb, Jr. has pointed out that although
at times Bultmann has justified his program of demythologizing as necessary for the kerygma to be credible to modern
man,31 this is probably not his basic principle. Rather, as
Cullmann, "Unzeitgemasse Bemerkungen," op. cit., pp. 266, 280.
ChZ, p. 26.
31 SO,for instance, in Bultmann's basic essay, "New Testament and
Mythology," in H. W. Bartsch, ed., Kerygma and Myth (New York,
1961), pp. 3 ff.; cf. Bartsch, "Anmerkungen zu 0. Cullmann," op. cit.,
p. 38 : "Finally i t must be the task of every interpretation, and with i t
also that of present-day proclamation, to align the New Testament
~vitnesswith the concepts of the present. This is indeed the driving
motive which we see a t the beginning of Bultmann's undertaking."
("Am Ende muss es doch Aufgabe einer jeden Interpretation und
damit auch der gegenwartigen Verkiindigung sein, das neutestamen29

30

36

EARLE HILGERT

Cobb says, "even if he were not so sure that in the modern
world we must think in terms of a closed universe, he would
still object to any account of the acts of God that pictured
them as tangible and visible from natural and historical
perspectives," 32 and this on the basis of two principles:
I) that of paradox ("that the act of God occurs in history but
never appears from the standpoint of historyJJ33) mediated
to him by the early Barth from Kierkegaard, and z ) the
existentialist herrneneutic, derived from Heidegger. I t is on
these two points, and particularly on that of existentialism,
that the debate between Cullmann and Bultmann appears
ultimately to rest. And here we are involved with two basically
different concepts of reality.

I t is on this fundamental question of existential interpretation that Cullmann has also set himself apart from the "New
Quest of the Historical JesusJ' undertaken by a number of
BultmannJsformer ~ t u d e n t s . ~ ~ T"New
h i s QuestJ' as contrasted
tliche Zeugnis mit den Begriffen der Gegenwart auszurichten. Das
ist aber das treibende Motiv, das wir am Anfang des Unternehmens
Bultmanns sehen.")
John B. Cobb., Jr., "The Post-Bultmannian Trend," JBR, XXX
(1964, 4.
33 Ibid., p. 3.
a4 See especially in English, James M. Robinson, A New Quest of
the Historical Jesus (Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 25; London,
1961); Gunther Bornkamm, Jesus of Nazareth (New York, 1960);
John B.Cobb, Jr., 09. cit.; James M. Robinson, "The Recent Debate
on the New Quest," JBR, XXX (1962)~198-208; Schubert M. Ogden,
"Bultmann and the New Quest," JBR, XXX (1962)~209-218 ; ifl
German, R. Bultmann, Das Verhaltnis der urchristlichen Christ~sbotschaft zum historisehen Jesus (Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger
Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Kl., Jg. 1960, 3. Abh. ;
Heidelberg, 1960); E. Fuchs, Zur Frage nach dem historischefi J e s ~ s
(Tiibingen, 1960); G. Ebeling, Theologie und Verkiindigung (Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie, Nr. I ; Tiibingen, 1962);
J . M. Robinson, Ker ygma und historischer Jesus (Zurich, I 960) ;
H. Ristow and K. Matthaiae, op. cit. ; and references in Robinson,
A New Quest, esp. pp. 10-11, n. I and p. 12, n. I.

with the "Old Quest" summarized by Albert Schweitzer35 in
the early years of the twentieth century, rejects any possibility
of reconstructing from the Gospel materials a biography of
Jesus through the use of the historical-critical method. Its
concern is rather to establish a continuity between the kerygma of the primitive church, proclaiming an exalted Lord,
and the preaching of Jesus of Nazareth? I t seeks an affirmative answer to the question, Did Jesus' preaching call men
to decision and existential self-understanding even as did the
proclamation of the early church ?
Cullmann has stated his position on this New Quest in his
essay contributed to the collection, Der historische Jesus und
der ker ygmatische Christus (see n. 28 above), entitled "Unzeitgemasse Bemerkungen zum 'historischen Jesus' der Bultmannschule" ("Unfashionable Remarks on the 'historical Jesus'
of the Bultmannian School"). His position is essentially that
while in principle he greets any attempt to know more of
the historical Jesus, and while he heartily endorses and uses
form-criticism and therefore denies with the Bultmannians
the possibility of reconstructing a biography of Jesus, yet he
sees form-criticism itself as demanding an attempt a t historical
objectivity which precludes recourse to an existential hermeneutic. Thus Cullmann attacks the New Quest a t the very
point-its existentialist orientation-which, as we have seen,
is at the base of his debate with Bultmann.
But Cullrnann too is engaged in a quest of the historical
Jesus. With the ''post-Bultmannians' ' he recognizes the
necessity of a historical continuity between the kerygma and
Jesus. Is his quest essentially the new or the old?
James Robinson has rejected the Old Quest on two grounds:
its methodological impossibility and its theological illegitim a ~ y . ~With
'
the first Cullmann agrees to the extent that
form-criticism correctly and "indeed consciously put aside the
36

Especially in his The Quest of the Historical Jesus (London, 1922).
Robinson, A New Quest, pp. 12 ff.

37

Ibid., pp. 26-47.
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question of the historical Jesus." 38 He goes on to emphasize
however that f orm-criticism nevertheless remains a positive
though difficult tool for "the determination of essential historical elements concerning his life and teaching." 39 On the
question of illegitimacy, Cullmann disagrees, as this theological illegitimacy for the post-Bultmannians is rooted in their
existential orientation. Cullmann would rather see certain
elements in Jesus' life and teachings as both methodologically
determinable and theologically essentiaL40
This makes understandable Cullmann's concern to find
already in Jesus' teaching the central kernel of the New
Testament message. At this point again he evinces an element
common to the New Quest. But whereas the latter seeks to
find "in Jesus the existentialist dialectic of believing existence
which he (Bultmann)finds first emerging explicitly in Paul and
John," 41 Cullmann's concern is not only with Jesus' teaching,
but also with Jesus' Messianic self-consciousn~ss (a characteristic concern of the Old Quest) as it bears on the central,
temporal eschatological tension between "already" and
"not yet."
38 Cullmann, "Unzeitgemasse Bemerkungen," op. cit., p. 266. He
seems to be thinking of form-criticism not simply in a narrow sense as
the identification and classification of literary types, but rather in the
broad sense of relating Gospel materials to the life situation of the
church and seeking to evaluate primary and secondary materials in
them. On this distinction between form-criticism per se and the
broader reorientation of Gospel scholarship of which it was a part,
see Robinson, A New Quest, pp. 36-38. It is this latter, broader trend
that dealt a death blow to the Old Quest.
39 Cullmann, "Unzeitgemasse Bemerkungen," op. cit., p. 267.
40 Cullmann, "The Necessity and Function of Higher Criticism,"
op. cit., p. 7: "The Biblical revelation in both the Old and New Testaments is a revelation of God in history, in the history of the people of
Israel which found its achievement in the incarnation of Jesus of
Nazareth and worked itself out through the primitive community. . . .
But as soon as we speak of Jesus of Nazareth, we speak of history, and
the history of Jesus presupposes a relationship both with the history
of Israel and with the history of the primitive church."
41 Robinson, "The Recent Debate on the 'New Quest,' " op. cit., 205.
42 Cullmann, Die Christologie des Neuen Testaments (Tiibingen,
195% pp. 117-134.

From the foregoing it appears clear that it is unfair to
classify Cullmann's quest either as a revival of the old or a
form of the new. His attitude toward the Gospels as testimonies of faith produced in the context of the living church
precludes a return to the Old Quest as such. But his rejection
of existentialism and his insistence on the theological necessity
of historical information regarding Jesus sets him apart from
the New Quest?
One concludes a survey such as the foregoing with a distinct
impression that much is to be expected from Cullmann's forthcoming book on eschatology. It can be anticipated that here
the pattern of his thought on a number of outstanding issues,
already so well advanced, will be largely completed.
43

Robinson's complaint ("The Recent Debate on the 'New Quest,'

"

up. cit., 204 f.) that a demonstration based on the historical-critical
method, of the continuity between Jesus the proclaimer and Jesus
Christ the proclaimed "does not answer the question of a material
unity of Jesus' words and deeds with the kerygma" would perhaps be
answerable from Cullmann's viewpoint by the fact that he finds that
which for him is central in the New Testament message to be a part
of Jesus' own messianic self-consciousness (which, of course, the
Bultmannians reject: cf. G. Bornkamm, Jesus von Nazareth [Stuttgart,
19591, pp. 155-163). Robinson's further statement, "nor can this
explanation of historical phenomena of the past 'mediate' an eschatological self-understanding to us today, in the way that the kerygma
does," seems to be a valid criticism only on existentialist presuppositions.

